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Abstract 
Exchange rate pass~through i~ the phenomenon whereby changes in the 
value of foreign exchange are reflected in changes in import prices. This 
paper presents a model in which firms are price setters who anticipate 
exchange rate changes. In equilibrium, firms' strategies incorporate 
expectations about the exchange rate consistently and are best responses to 
the strategies of all others in the world market. It is shown that exchange 
rate changes give rise to import price changes, but the degree of exchange 
rate pass-through depends upon domestic and foreign market structures and the 
exchange rate regime. In general, exchange rate pass-through is higher if the 
home m,~rket is monopolistic or if the foreign market is competitive. The 
paper ':oncludes with an examination of disaggregated Japanese manufacturing 
price indices, and it shows that the degree of exchange rate pass-through was 
indeed correlated with industry concentration during the most recent period of 
the yell's depreciation against the dollar. 
A Model of Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
Eric Q'N. Fisher* 
1. Introduction 
During the 1980's, there have been more than 160 days when the 
weighted-average value of the dollar varied by more than one percent between 
the openlng and closing of the foreign exchange market in New York. In the 
same period, the variance of the monthly changes of the Federal Reserve 
Board's dollar index has been more than six percent. The dollar prices of 
non-oil imports, of course, have been much less volatile. This fact is 
difficult to explain if goods are imported at cost in a competitive market. 
:~n oligopolistic industries, however, it has been observed that 
domestic currency prices do not move immediately with exchange rate movements. 
Even over a relatively long period, these import prices do not reflect 
exchange rate movements fully. The presumption is that producers' profit 
margins change, at least in the short run, when foreign exchange values 
change. The empirical studies cited below show that, as a general rule of 
thumb, prices of non-oil imports into the United States have reflected only 
between fifty and eighty percent of a change in the value of the dollar. 
*The author is a staff economist in the International Finance Division. This 
paper represents the views of the author and should not be interpreted as 
reflecting those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or 
other members of its staff. The author would like to thank Cathy Mann for 
discussions which stimulated his initial interest in this subject. He would 
also to thank Richard Rosen, Garry Schinasl, David Gordon, Jonathan Eaton, 
Avinash Dixit, Sally Davies, Ralph Tryon, and seminar participants at Cornell 
University for comments on an earlier draft. Any remaining mistakes are of 
course his own. 
T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  p r i c e  a n d ·  d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y  
p r i c e  i s  t e r m e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h .  T h e r e  h a v e  b e e n  q u i t e  a  f e w  
e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  p h e n o m e n o n ,  a n d  t h e  r e c e n t  v o l a t i l i t y  o f  t h e  d o l l a r  
h a s  s p u r r e d  r e n e w e d  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  s u b j e c t .  S e v e r a l  s t u d i e s  h a v e  s : h o w e d  t h a t  
t h e  m a r k - u p  o f  i m p o r t  p r i c e  a b o v e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  s e e m s  t o  h a v e  i n c r e a , s e d  d u r i n g  
t h e  r e c e n t  p e r i o d  o f  t h e  d o l l a r ' s  a p p p r e c i a t i o n  a n d  s u b s e q u e n t  r a p i d  d e c l i n e .  
A  r e c e n t  s t u d y  o f  t h i s  p h e n o m e n o n  i s  b y  M a n n  [ 1 5 ] ;  F e i n b e r g  [ 7 ]  a n d  F l o o d  [ 8 ]  
h a v e  a l s o  e x a m i n e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h .  T h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  o l d e r  
s t u d i e s  a s  w e l l ;  s e e  C l a r k ,  L o g u e ,  a n d  S w e e n e y  [ 4 ]  a n d  D u n n  [ 6 ] ,  f o r  e x a m p l e .  
W h i l e  t h e r e  i s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  l i t e r a t u r e  o n  t h e  w e l f a r e  e f f e c t s  o f  
p r i c e  v a r i a b i l i t y  w h i c h  d a t e s  b a c k  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  w a r  ( s e e  W a u g h  [ 1 8 ] ,  O i  [ 1 6 ] ,  
a n d  S a m u e l s o n  [ 1 7 ]  f o r  a  l i v e l y  d e b a t e ) ,  i t  i s  p e r h a p s  s u r p r i s i n g  t h c l t  t h e r e  
i s  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  r e c e n t  t h e o r e t i c a l  w o r k  o n  t h e  m i c r o e c o n o m i c s  o f  
o l i g o p o l i s t i c  p r i c e  s e t t i n g  u n d e r  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y .  K r u g m a r :  [ 7 ]  
e m p h a s i z e d  t h a t  t h e  p h e n o m e n o n  o f  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h  w a s  a n  a r e a  i n  
w h i c h  t h e  n e w e r  m o d e l s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  t h e o r y  w o u l d  f i n d  a  r e a d y  
a p p l i c a t i o n ;  h e  e x a m i n e d  a  v a r i e t y  o f  s t a t i c  a n d  d Y n a m i c  m o d e l s  i l l u s t r a t i n g  
a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  c u r r e n c y  f l u c t u a t i o n s  a n d  i m p o r t  p r i c e  
c h a n g e s .  D o r n b u s c h  [ 5 ]  a l s o  s t u d i e d  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  s h o r t - t e r m  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  
c h a n g e s  i n  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  m o d e l s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n ;  h e  e m p h a s i z e d  
t h a t  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t a t i o n  a n d  m a r k e t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  i m p o r t  p r i c e s  a n d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s .  B o t h  o f  t h e s e  p a p e r s  a p p e a l e d  t o  
t h e  u s e  o f  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  m o d e l s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  
d i s p a r a t e  f a c e t s  o f  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h .  T h i s  p a p e r  i s  m e a n t  t o  
p r e s e n t  a  u n i f i e d  t r e a t m e n t  o f  p a s s - t h r o u g h  w i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e w o r k  o f  o n e  m o d e l ,  
w h i c h  u s e s  p r i c e  a s  t h e  f i r m ' s  c h o i c e  v a r i a b l e  a n d  e m p l o y s  a  B a y e s i a n  N a s h  
e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n c e p t .  
This model captures four stylized facts. First, it incorporates the 
idea that producers set prices in anticipation of exchange rate changes. 
Indeed, under the current exchange raCe regime, it would be prohibitively 
expensive for most manufacturers in industrialized countries to change their 
offer price with every movement of the value of foreign exchange. Second, by 
emphasizing the strategic interdependence of producers' decisions, this model 
shows that market structure has an influence on exchange rate pass-through. 
Third, the model is built upon the premise that the effects of exchange rate 
changes are quite different in. the short run from what they are in the long 
run. Fourth, it captures the notion that pass-through is different under a 
regime of fixed exchange rates from what it is under floating rates. 
There are two effects that exchange rate movements have in any market. 
First, a depreciation makes domestic producers lower cost-world producers. 
Second, a depreciation shifts world demand towards the home country. It is 
not immE!diately obvious what the best response of a foreign oligopolist would 
be in such a situation. If he had been pricing above marginal cost, should he 
cut his offer price to maintain world market share? Will domestic producers 
raise price more than proportionately because of increased world demand for 
their goods? What are the interactions between the best responses of home and 
foreign producers? In perfectly competitive markets, will price move exactly 
to match exchange rate changes? What effects will differential degrees of 
domestic and foreign competitiveness have on exchange rate pass-through? The 
model presented here will address these questions. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we present 
the model, and in the third section, we show that an equilibrium exists for 
any description of home and foreign market structures. In the fourth section, 
w e  d e s c r i b e  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h  i n  a  r e g i m e  o f  f i x e d  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e s ,  a n d  i n  t h e  f i f t h  s e c t i o n ,  w e  s h o w  i t s  e f f e c t s  i n  a  r e g i m e  o f  
f l o a t i n g  r a t e s .  T h e  s i x t h  s e c t i o n  p r e s e n t s  a n  e m p i r i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e s e  
i d e a s  u s i n g  s a l e s  a n d  p r i c e  d a t a  f r o m  n i n e  J a p a n e s e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s ;  
i t  s h o w s  t h a t  p a s s - t h r o u g h  w a s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  i n d u s t r y  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  t h e  d o l l a r s  a p p r e c i a t i o n ,  b u t  t h i s  
c o r r e l a t i o n  i s  l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n t  d u r i n g  t h e  d o l l a r ' s  d e p r e c i a t i o n .  T h e  
s e v e n t h 	  s e c t i o n  p r e s e n t s  o u r  c o n c l u s i o n .  
2 . 	  T h e  M o d e l  
W e  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  n  d o m e s t i c  f i r m s  a n d  n *  f o r e i g n  f i r m s ,  w h e r e  
*  . . .
a r e  
 
T h e  f i r m s  p r o d u c e  a  h o m o g e n e o u s  g o o d  a n d  a c tn a n d  n  p o s 1 t 1 v e  1 n t e g e r s .  
a s  B e r t r a n d  c o m p e t i t o r s .  T h e  f i r m s  i n  a n y o n e  c o u n t r y  a r e  i d e n t i c a l ;  t h e y  
h a v e  c o n s t a n t  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  a n d  n o  c a p a c i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s .  W e  n o r m a l i z e  p r i c e s  
i n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y  s o  t h a t  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  a  d o m e s t i c  fi:~m i s  
u n i t y .  W e  a s s u m e  f u r t h e r  t h a t  f o r e i g n  m a r g i n a l  c o s t s  a r e  u n i t y  i n  t H r m s  o f  
f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y .  H e n c e ,  w h e n  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i s  o n e ,  d o m e s t i c  a n d  f o r e i g n  
c o s t s  a r e  e q u a l .  T h i s  i s  m e a n t  t o  c a p t u r e  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  l o n g - t e r m  f a c t o r  
p r i c e  e q u a l i z a t i o n ,  w h i c h  i s  o f  c o u r s e  a  r e a l ,  n o t  a  m o n e t a r y  p h e n o m e n o n .  
T h e r e  i s  a  d o m e s t i c  a n d  a  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t  f o r  t h e  g o o d .  D e m C L n d  i n  t h e  
d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t  i s  g i v e n  b y  O ( p ) ,  a n d  d e m a n d  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t  i . s  g i v e n  b y  
D * ( p ) .  T h e s e  d e m a n d  f u n c t i o n s  p l a c e  t h e  a n a l y s i s  u n a b a s h e d l y  w i t h i n  t h e  
f r a m e w o r k  o f  p a r t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  a r e  n o  i n c o m e  effect~:. W e  m a k e  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f u r t h e r  a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  d e m a n d .  
A s s u m p t i o n  1 :  O ( p )  a n d  O * ( p )  a r e  c o n t i n u o u s ,  n o n - i n c r e a s i n g ,  a n d  c o n c a v e .  
T h e r e  e x i s t s  p >  1  s u c h  t h a t ,  f o r  a l l  p  ~ p ,  O ( p )  - O .  A l s o ,  0 ( 0 )  i . s  
finite. Further, there exists 1'* > 1 such that, for all p ~ 1'*, D*(p) O. 
Also, D*(O) is finite. We do .not assume that 1'=1'* 
Assumption 1 states that there are prices above which there is no demand in 
the domestic and the foreign market. It also implies that demand does not 
become unbounded as price decreases. The concavity of the demand in each 
country will allow for natural comparative statics; in particular, an expected 
depreciation will cause a domestic monopolist to raise his offer. 
We can now write the profit function of a domestic producer under the 
assumption that his offer is the lowest offer in terms of the domestic 
currency. We have 
(s-l)(O(s) + O*(s/e» if s/s* :S e
 
1I'(s;e) (1)
{
- 0 if e < s/s* 
where 11' i:; profits in domestic currency, s is the firm's domestic offer price, 
e is the :~ealized value of the exchange rate, and we recall that the marginal 
cost of pl~oduction is normalized to be unity. Note that an increase in e is a 
depreciat:~on of the domestic currency. Domestic currency profits are random 
and depend upon the exchange rate because foreign consumers pay a price 
denominatE!d in the foreign currency. Equation (1) uses the implicit 
assumption that the home producer cannot discriminate between geographically 
distinct markets; this is equivalent to assuming that no dumping is allowed. 
We write t:he profit function for an analogous foreign producer for 
completenE!ss' sake 
i f  
*
s i s
 
~ e ·  
*
~(s ; e )  
= { 0  
( 2 )  
(s*-l)(D(~s*) +  D * ( s * »  
i f  e  <  
*
s i s
 
w h e r e  f o r e i g n  p r o f i t s  a r e  d e n o m i n a t e d  i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  a n d  a g a i n  w e  h a ' l e  
u s e d  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  f o r e i g n  m a r g i n a l  c o s t s  a r e  u n i t y  i n  t e r m s  o f  forei~r: 
c u r r e n c y .  
W e  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  e  f o l l o w s  a  p r o c e s s  s u m m a r i z e d  b y  
t h e  d e n s i t y  f e e ) .  F o l l o w i n g  t h e  u s u a l  c o n v e n t i o n ,  w e  i n t e r p r e t  F ( t )  a s  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  e v e n t  e  ~ t  o c c u r s ,  w h e r e  F ( e )  i s  o f  c o u r s e  t h e  
c u m u l a t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  f e e ) .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  w e  
i n t e r p r e t  t h e  e v e n t  F ( t )  a s  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  h a s  
a p p r e c i a t e d  a t  l e a s t  t o  t .  T o  a v o i d  m a t h e m a t i c a l  c o m p l e x i t i e s ,  w e  s h a l l  
a s s u m e  
A s s u m p t i o n  2 :  T h e  s u p p o r t  o f  e  i s  e i t h e r :  ( i )  a  p o i n t  g r e a t e r  t h a n  0 ;  ( ) r  (ii~ 
a  s u b s e t  o f  t h e  p o s i t i v e  r e a l  n u m b e r s  w h i c h  i s  a  b o u n d e d  c l o s e d  i n t e r v a l  n o :  
c o n t a i n i n g  O .  F u r t h e r ,  i f  ( i i )  i s  t h e  c a s e ,  t h e n  f e e )  i s  c o n t i n u o u s ,  
d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  o n  i t s  s u p p o r t ,  a n d  ~(e)-f(e)/[l-F(e)] i s  i n c r e a s i n g  i n  e .  
T h e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  A s s u m p t i o n  2  i m p o s e s  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  t h e  exchangE~ r a t e  
c a n n o t  d e p r e c i a t e  o r  a p p r e c i a t e  i n f i n i t e l y .  T h e  s e c o n d  p a r t  o f  t h i s  
a s s u m p t i o n  e n s u r e s  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a  f i r m ' s  e x p e c t e d  
p r o f i t  m a x i m i z a t i o n  a r e  w e l l  b e h a v e d .  T h e  t e r m  ~(e) i s  t h e  h a z a r d  r a t e  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  d e n s i t y  f e e ) ;  i t  i s  i n c r e a s i n g  f o r  a  n o r m a l  o r  a  unifor~ 
d e n s i t y .  T h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  w i l l  e n a b l e  u s  t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  0 :  
a n  e x p e c t e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  c h a n g e .  
As is typical in analyses of Bertrand competition, we assume that all 
demand in any market is allocated to the seller declaring the lowest offer. 
The sequence of events influencing the oligopolists' decisions is as follows. 
First, ::irms simultaneously announce offers in their respective currencies; 
these announcements are interpreted as binding commitments to sell to all 
demande;~s, regardless of provenance, at the announced offer price. Second, 
the exchange rate is realized, and demand is allocated to the lowest offer in 
a commOl1 currency. In the case of ties, demand is allocated (equally) to the 
produce:~(s) having the lowest cost(s), using the realized value of the 
exchang4~ rate to compare. This rationing rule is an artifice used to make 
proofs of the existence of an equilibrium easier. We use it to simplify the 
analysis, and it will enable us to use the standard result that the 
equilibrium price in a Bertrand game is (just under) the cost of the second 
lowest :ost producer. In a discrete price space, we would not have to worry 
about this technicality, and here it does not alter the nature of our results. 
The timing of decisions in the model is quite similar to that in 
Mankiw [14]. He assumes that firms set prices in anticipation of shocks to 
industry demand. When there is a small shock to industry demand, firms may be 
unwilling ~ post to change their prices because they must pay a cost to do 
so. The nature of contracts in international trade and the current volatility 
of exchange rates make this assumption about the timing of firms' decisions a 
natural one for our model. 
We conclude this section with a formal statement of the expected 
profits of a home and a foreign producer. Any producer who does not declare a 
minimal offer among the set of producers of his own nationality makes no 
profit; hence, we need consider only the most competitive domestic and foreign 
o f f e r s .  T h e n ,  i g n o r i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t i e s  f o r  a  m o m e n t ,  w e  c a l l  w r i t e  a  
d o m e s t i c  f i r m ' s  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t s  a s  
e  
( 3 )
V  I : ( s ; e )  f ( e )  d e  
( s i s  )  
w h e r e  t h e  u p p e r  l i m i t  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n  i s  t h e  h i g h e s t  p o s s i b l e  devalu~tion t h a t  
c a n  o c c u r  a n d  t h e  l o w e r  l i m i t  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  t h e  e v e n t  w h o s e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  F ( s / s * )  ,  w h i c h  o c c u r s  w h e n  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t e s  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  s o  t h a t  t h e  o f f e r  s  i s  n o  l o n g e r  c o m p e t i t i v e  a g a i n s t  s k ,  t h e  b e s t  
f o r e i g n  o f f e r .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  l - F ( s / s * )  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  prob~bility t h a t  
s  <  e s * ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  t h e  b e s t  o f f e r  b y  a  d o m e s t i c  f i r m  i s  t h e  b e s t  
o f f e r  i n  t h e  w o r l d  m a r k e t .  L i k e w i s e ,  a g a i n  t e m p o r a r i l y  i g n o r i n g  t i e s ,  w e  h a v e  
t h e  f o r e i g n  f i r m ' s  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t s  g i v e n  b y  
f ( e )  d e  
( 4 )  
w h e r e  t h e  l o w e r  l i m i t  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n  i s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p o s s i b l e  a p p r e : c i a t i o n  o f  
t h e  c u r r e n c y  a n d  t h e  u p p e r  l i m i t  a g a i n  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  t C t e  e x c h a n g e  
r a t e  d e p r e c i a t e s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s o  t h a t  t h e  f o r e i g n  f i r m ' s  o f f e r  i s  r~ l o n g e r  
c o m p e t i t i v e .  W e  s a y  t h a t  s a n d  s *  a r e  e q u i l i b r i u m  s t r a t e g i e s  i f ,  g i v e n  c o m m o n  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p r o c e s s  a s  s u m m a r i z e d  b y  f ( e ) ,  s  
m a x i m i z e s  ( 3 )  a n d  s *  c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  m a x i m i z e s  ( 4 ) .  
3. Equilibrium 
The central result of this section is that an equilibrium exists for 
all pos;;ible combinations of domestic and foreign market structures. The 
assumption of Bertrand competition provides a convenient description of the 
domestil: and foreign market structures. If there is one domestic producer, we 
shall say that the domestic market is monopolistic; if there are two or more 
domestie producers, we shall say that the domestic market is perfectly 
competi·~ive. We use the analogous definitions for the foreign market. This 
corresponds to the intuition we derive from the fact that two identical 
Bertrand competitors price at marginal cost in equilibrium if there is no 
capacity constraint facing either one. 
We begin with a simple lemma. 
Lemma 1: If there are two or more domestic (foreign) producers, then in 
equi1ib:~ium either (i) no domestic (foreign) firm has positive expected sales 
or (ii) the best offer by a domestic (foreign) firm is an offer at marginal 
cost. 
Proof: Assume that the best offer by a domestic firm is an offer above 
marginal cost and that it has positive expected sales. Let SO be that offer. 
By assmnption SO > 1. Then, the expected return of that strategy is 
eV ( S O ) - J~(s;e) f e e ) d e
( 5 )
 
    
 
( s o / s * )  
w h e r e  a g a i n  s *  i s  t h e  b e s t  f o r e i g n  o f f e r .  S i n c e  t h e  f i r m  h a s  p o s i t i v e  
e x p e c t e d  s a l e s ,  s O / s *  <  e ,  a n d  f o r  a n y  s  s a t i s f y i n g  1  <  s  <  s o ,  i t  i s  t r u e  
t h a t  V ( s )  >  O .  H e n c e  t h e  b e s t  r e s p o n s e  o f  a  f i r m  c a l l i n g  a n  o f f e r  a b o v e  S O  i s  
t o  o f f e r  s o m e  s  <  s o ,  w h i c h  c o n t r a d i c t s  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
A n  e x a c t l y  a n a l o g o u s  l i n e  o f  r e a s o n i n g  f o l l o w s  f o r  t h e  c a s e  ~~ere 
t h e r e  a r e  t w o  o r  m o r e  f o r e i g n  c o m p e t i t o r s .  Q . E . D .  
T h e  i n t u i t i o n  b e h i n d  L e m m a  1  i s  s i m p l e  e n o u g h .  I f  t h e  b e s t  o f f e r  b y  a  
d o m e s t i c  c o m p e t i t o r  i s  a b o v e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  a n d  i s  s t i l l  g o o d  e n o u g h  t : o  h a v e  
s o m e  c h a n c e  o f  b e a t i n g  t h e  b e s t  f o r e i g n  o f f e r ,  t h e n  t h e  b e s t  r e s p o n s E  o f  a  
s e c o n d  d o m e s t i c  c o m p e t i t o r  w i l l  b e  t o  u n d e r c u t  i t .  T h i s  a l l o w s  o n l y  f o r  
o f f e r s  a t  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
W e  c a n  n o w  s t a t e  a n  e x i s t e n c e  t h e o r e m .  
T h e o r e m  1 :  U n d e r  A s s u m p t i o n s  1  a n d  2 ,  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  e x i s t s  f o r  a l l  p o s s i b l e  
m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e s .  
P r o o f :  W h e n e v e r  n  ~ 2  
a n d  
*
n
 
~ 2 ,  w e  c a n  u s e  L e m m a  1  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  w h i c h  a l l  c o m p e t i t o r s  p r i c e  a t  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t s .  
I n  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  p r o o f ,  w e  w i l l  e x p l o r e  t h e  c a s e s  w h e r e  n = l  o r  n * = J . .  
A g a i n ,  l e t  t h e  i n f i m u m  o f  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  e  b e  g i v e n  b y  e _  a n d  i t s  
s u p r e m u m  b y e .  B y  A s s u m p t i o n  2 ,  0  <  e  S  e  <  ~ 
L e t S = { s :  1 S s  . . . :  
- --* * - - -* 
max[p,p /e_]}, and S - {s: 1 ~ s ~ max[e p,p ]}. Notice that for a 
domestic firm any s f£ S is dominated hy an s E S; likewise, for a foreign finn 
any s E~ S* is dominated by an s E S*. Without loss of generality, then, we 
can re:;trict our attention to strategies on Sand S*. Note that Sand S* are 
non-empty and compact. 
There are two cases to consider: either (i) e is a degenerate random 
variable; or (ii) fee) is continuous and differentiable on a closed interval. 
If fee) is continuous, for any fixed sand s* played in equilibrium, the 
probability that s=es* is zero; hence, we can ignore the possibility of ties. 
Considl~r the expression for a domestic firm's expected profits as given in 
(3). It is easy to see that ~(p) is continuous because D and D* are. 
Furthe:r, because fee) is continuous and bounded at the lower limit of 
integration, V(s) is continuous on S. Analogous arguments are true for the 
continuity of a foreign producer's expected profits. Then, by Glicksberg [9], 
an equilibrium exists. 
If ~ is a degenerate random variable and hence e e, the theorem 
is equivalent to stating that an equilibrium exists in a Bertrand game where 
demand is continuous and the competitors have different costs. Because of the 
rationing rule stated in the second section, such an equilibrium exists, with 
the 10~lest cost world producer pricing at the cost of the second lowest cost 
firm, using the exchange rate to compare costs of firms of different 
nationalities. Q.E.D. 
Before concluding this section, it will be instructive to write out
 
the fi:~s t order condi tion for a monopolis t' s profit maximization.
 
Differl~ntiating (3) and taking full advantage of the smoothness of world
 
d e m a n d  a n d  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  w e  s e e  t h a t  a  dom~stic r n u n r J p ' J ]  i~J' 
e q u l i b r i u m  s t r a t e g y  satisfi~s 
e  
O .  ( 6 )
a v / a s  ~ J  (a~(s;e)/as) £ ( e )  d e  - (l/s*)~(s;s/s*) £ ( s / s * )  
( s / s * )  
R e c a l l  t h a t  s / s *  i s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  t h a t  j u s t  m a k e s  t h e  h o m e  
f i r m  c o m p e t i t i v e .  T h i s  m a k e s  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  ( 6 )  s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d ;  i t  
s a y s  t h a t  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  c h a r g e d  b y  t h e  d o m e s t i c  f i r m  i s  suc'~ t h a t  i~~ 
e x p e c t e d  m a r g i n a l  p r o f i t  i n  s t a t e s  o f  t h e  w o r l d  w h e r e  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  h a s  
d e p r e c i a t e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  m a k e  i t  c o m p e t i t i v e  i s  j u s t  e q u a l  t o  t h e  g a i n  frG~ 
u n d e r c u t t i n g  t h e  b e s t  p r i c e  o f  a  f o r e i g n  c o m p e t i t o r .  L i k e w i s e ,  t h e  f i r s t  
o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  a  f o r e i g n  m o n o p o l i s t  i s  
s  
( s J /  * )  * *  *  
a v * / a s *  
( a 1 r  ( s  ; e ) / a  s )  
f ( e )  d e  - ( s / s * 2 ) 1 r * ( s * ; s / s * )  f ( s / s * )  
o .  
( 7  )  
e  
A g a i n ,  e q u a t i o n  ( 7 )  h a s  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  f o r e i g n  f i r m  c h a r g e s  a  
p r i c e  h i g h  e n o u g h  s o  t h a t  t h e  e x p e c t e d  m a r g i n a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  p r o f i t s  i n  s t a : e s  
o f  t h e  w o r l d  w h e r e  t h e  c u r r e n c y  a p p r e c i a t e s  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  l o s s  f r o m  n o t  
m a t c h i n g  t h e  b e s t  p r i c e  o f  a  h o m e  f i r m  a t  t h e  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  
r a t e .  T h e s e  f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  w i l l  b e  u s e f u l  i n  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  a n a l y s i s .  
4. Pass-Through Effects in a Regime of Fixed Exchange Rates 
In the preceding section, we concentrated on analyses of the 
equilibri\~ offers by domestic and foreign firms; we did not discuss the 
expected E!quilibrium market price that such offers and the density of the 
exchange rate entail. As will become apparent in this section, the
 
equilibril~ price prevailing in the market does not always reflect fully
 
realized c.hanges in the exchange rate. 
We begin with the observation that the equilibrium (home currency) 
price in the market is given by 
p(e;s,s*) - min[s, es*] (8) 
where again sand s* are respectively the best home and foreign firms' offers. 
An immediate consequence of the timing of offers in the model is that prices 
gx ~ may not reflect fully the effects of large depreciations. To see this 
more clearly, let us turn our attention to Figure 1, which appears on page 33. 
Figure 1 graphs the equilibrium market price in terms of the realized exchange 
rate under the arbitrary assumption that (s/s*) > 1. Notice that, for large 
depreciatilJns the home currency, the equilibrium price can be no larger that s 
because thla best domestic offer is fixed in the short term. On the other 
hand, rea1:lzations of the exchange rate e < (s/s*) will result in market 
prices whic:h are lower than s, but even if e < 1, it may still be the case 
that pee) :> 1. As we shall see below, a shift in the distribution of the 
exchange rate has two effects: first, it causes firms' offers to change in a 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium; second, given those equilibrium offers, it changes 
the expectE!d equilibrium market price. This is an important positive 
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e c a u s e  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f f e r s  m a y  n o t  b e  o b s e r v a h l e ,  w h e r e a s  m a r k e t  
p r i c e s  a r e .  
W e  a r e  n o w  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  t o  d e f i n e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h  
f o r m a l l y .  R e c a l l  t h a t  w e  h a v e  s t r u c t u r e d  t h e  m o d e l  s o  t h a t  t h e  i m p l i c i t  
s t a t u s  g u o  i s  t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i s  u n i t y ;  
m o r e o v e r ,  t h e  p a s t  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p r o c e s s  w a s  a l s o  u n i t y ,  
a l b e i t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  m a y  h a v e  h a d  s o m e  v a r i a n c e .  T h e  
c u r r e n t  m a r k e t  p r i c e ,  h o w e v e r ,  m a y  n o t  b e  1 ;  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  d e p e n d s  u p o n  
t h e  b e s t  f o r e i g n  a n d  d o m e s t i c  o f f e r s ,  w h i c h  w e r e  b a s e d  u p o n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  h e l d  
b e f o r e  t h e  c u r r e n t  p e r i o d .  E x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h  w i l l  b e  d e f i n e d  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  t h i s  b e n c h m a r k .  L e t  s a n d  s *  b e  t h e  b e s t  o f f e r s  i n  a n  i n i t i a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  w h e r e  E e - l ,  a n d  l e t  s '  a n d  s * '  b e  b e s t  o f f e r s  u n d e r  a n  
a l t e r n a t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  w h e r e  Ee~l. F u r t h e r ,  l e t  p ( e )  
b e  t h e  p a s s - t h r o u g h  c o e f f i c i e n t ,  w h e r e  w e  h a v e  d e n o t e d  e x p l i c i t l y  t h a t  p a s s ­
t h r o u g h  d e p e n d s  u p o n  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e .  W e  h a v e  t h e n  
D e f i n i t i o n :  p ( e )  - [ p ( e ; s '  , s * ' )  - p ( l ; s , s * ) ] / [ e  - 1 ]  
( 9 )  
w h e r e  p ( e )  i s  g i v e n  i n  ( 8 )  a n d  d e p e n d s  i m p l i c i t l y  o n  s a n d  s *  a s  w e l l  a s  e .  
T h i s  e q u a t i o n  d e f i n e s  o b s e r v e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h  i s  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  
c h a n g e  i n  m a r k e t  p r i c e  d i v i d e d  b y  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e .  
N o t i c e  t h a t  p ( e )  i s  w e l l  d e f i n e d  o n l y  w h e n  e~l; t h a t  i s ,  t h e r e  m u s t  b e  a n  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e  c h a n g e  i n  o r d e r  f o r  t h e r e  t o  b e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h .  
A l t h o u g h  w e  h a v e  d e f i n e d  p a s s - t h r o u g h  i n  t e r m s  o f  c h a n g e s  i n  d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y  
p r i c e s ,  i t  c o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  d e f i n e d  e q u a l l y  w e l l  i n  t e r m s  o f  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  
p r i c e  c h a n g e s .  
Assume that past expectations are summarized by a degenerate random 
to1 pro?abi1ityvariable e which is equal l with il  1; assume, not 
inconsistently, that the current realization of the exchange rate is also 1. 
Assume further that there is a new density for the exchange rate such that Ee 
= l+k, for k in a neighborhood of 0; that is, firms perfectly anticipate a 
devaluation (revaluation) of lOOk percent if k > ° (if k < 0). We now state a 
series of lemmata which lead to the main result of this section. 
Lemma 2: Under fixed exchange rates, if n > 1 and n* > 1, then (i) if k < 0, 
p(l+k)=l, and (ii) if k > 0, p(l+k)=O. 
Proof: Using Lemma 1, we know that s=s*=l. The conclusion follows from the 
uniqueness of the equilibrium and an evaluation of (9). 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2 nhows immediately that exchange rate changes can have asymmetric 
effects. This follows, of course from the assumption that demand is allocated 
according to the lowest price in domestic currency. 
"re continue wi th Lemma 3. 
Lemma 3: Under fixed exchange rates if n > 1 and n*=l, then (i) if k < 0, 
p(l+k)=O, and (ii) if k > 0, p(l+k)=O. 
Proof: Again, using Lemma 1, we know that s=l. It is easy to check that 
s*=l/(l+k) is a best response to s. Again, the conclusion follows from the 
uniqueness of the equilibrium and an evaluation of (9). Q.E.D. 
W e  n o w  s t a t e  L e m m a  4 .  
L e m m a  4 :  U n d e r  f i x e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s  i f  n - l  a n d  n *  >  1 ,  t h e n  ( i )  i f  k  <  0 ,  
p ( l + k ) = l ,  a n d  ( i i )  i f  k  >  0 ,  p ( l + k ) = l .  
P r o o f :  T h e  r e a s o n i n g  i s  e x a c t l y  a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h a t  o f  L e m m a  3 .  
Q . E  D .  
W e  s t a t e  L e m m a  5 .  
L e m m a  5 :  U n d e r  f i x e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s  i f  n = l  a n d  n * = l ,  t h e n  ( i )  i f  k  <  0 ,  
p(l+k)~O, a n d  ( i i )  i f  k  >  0 ,  p ( l + k ) - l .  
P r o o f :  I f  k  <  0 ,  t h e n ,  a g a i n  u s i n g  t h e  r a t i o n i n g  r u l e  d e s c r i b e d  i n  s e c t i o n  2 ,  
t h e  u n i q u e  e q u i l i b r i u m  s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  s * = l / ( l + k )  a n d  s = l .  I f  k  >  0 ,  t h e n  t h e  
u n i q u e  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  g i v e n  b y  s * = l  a n d  s - l + k .  A g a i n ,  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  f o l l o w s  
f r o m  a n  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  ( 9 ) .  Q . E . D .  
W e  n o w  s t a t e  t h e  m a i n  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  
T h e o r e m  2 :  U n d e r  f i x e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s ,  a n  a p p r e c i a t i o n  i s  d e f l a t i o n a r y  i f  a n d  
o n l y  i f  t h e  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t  i s  c o m p e t i t i v e ,  a n d  a  d e p r e c i a t i o n  i s  i n f l a t i o n a r y  
i f  a n d  o n l y  i f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t  i s  m o n o p o l i s t i c .  
P r o o f :  T h e  c o n c l u s i o n  f o l l o w s  f r o m  L e m m a t a  2  t h r o u g h  5 .  
Q . E . D .  
Theorem 2 makes explicit our intuition. We see that there is a strong pass­
through e::fect to the extent that the domestic or foreign market structure 
enables a producer to use his market power to set price when the exchange rate 
moves in 11is favor. One policy implication of Theorem 2 is that fixed 
exchange ]~ates, with periodic readjustments, display an inflationary bias for 
monopo1izHdl  industries. Of course, when we speak of inflation here, we mean a 
once and for all change in the price level of an industry, not a persistent 
change in the rate of increase of a macro-economic price index. Moreover, we 
are not dE~scribing a steady state in the international industry. Implicit in 
mode1i.ng is the notion that industry costs equalized at theour l framework are 
prevailin~; steady-state exchange rate; if there is a depreciation which makes 
the domestic industry a world monopoly, then, in the long run, there will be 
entry into the industry by a domestic firm or a change of production 
techniques by foreign producers to restore the initial status guo in which 
both foreign and domestic firms had the same expected costs. 
5. Pass-Through Effects in a Regime of Floating Exchange Rates 
In this section, we analyze the effects of pass-through when the 
distribution of the exchange rate is not degenerate. In particular, we will 
examine the case where the support of e is an interval and f(e) is smooth, as 
described by Assumption 2(ii). This assumption allows in essence for some 
short-term price noise, which affects the equilibrium offers of the 
oligopo1ists. Before proceding to it is worthl the heart of the analysis, 
mentioning that the assumption of a regime of floating exchange rates gives 
rise to an inherent difference between the expected market price and the 
realized market price; likewise, there is a difference between the expected 
pass-through effect and the realized pass-through effect. 'Under a regi.me of 
fixed rates, these distinctions- are moot,.but it will be important to have 
that distinction clearly in mind during the rest of the discussion. 
It is well known that the convexity of the profit function implies 
that expected profits increase with a mean-preserving spread of the price of 
output. In our model, this implies that price noise gives rise to positive 
expected profits for a monopolist in of either nationality. We state Lemma 6. 
Lemma 6: Under flexible exchange rates, if n-1 (n*-l), then either (i) s > 1l
(s* > 1) or (ii) the domestic (foreign) monopolist has no expected sales. 
Further, a system of flexible exchange rates guarantees positive expect3d 
profits even if there is no expected exchange rate change. 
Proof: Let s* be a best foreign offer in equilibrium. -If *es  s 1, then a 
home firm has no expected sales. If 1 < es*, then for any s such that I
-< *es , we
<
have 
 5 
e 
V(s) J :(s;e) f(e) de > 0 (10) 
(s/s ) 
where in (12) V, again, is the value of the game for the home firm. An 
exactly analogous argument is true for a foreign monopolist. The last part of 
I,the lemma follows from the fact that if Ee - 1  Assumption 2(ii) implies e < 
1 < e. Q.E.D. 
The intui ~::ion behind Lemma 6 is that the assumption of flexible exchange rates 
introduce:; enoug~ price noise so that, if there is some chance that the 
exchange l~ate will depreciate, a domestic monopolist can still have positive 
expected :;ales by pricing above marginal cost. 
The best response of a monopolist will in general dependt upon all the 
moments of the distribution of the exchange rate. The easiest way to see this 
is to rewrite equation (6) as 
e 
Ja,,(,,; e) las f(e) de - [(s-1) IS*) [D(s) + D*(s*) J f(s/s*). (11) 
(s/s*) 
Equation (11) is a restatement of the first order necessary condition for a 
home monopolist. The left hand side of (11) depends not only on the mean of 
the exchange rate but also on the weight that the density f(e) places on 
different levels of marginal profits in the world market. 
TIlis leads us to examine a class of shifts of the distribution of the 
exchange rate which change the first moment but not any other central moments. 
In partic\llar, we will examine distributions which belong to the same location 
family. Let f(e) be an arbitrary distribution satisfying Assumption 2(ii) and 
fef(e)de •• 1. For k in a neighborhood of 0, we define 
Definitiotl: The density g is a k-shift of f if and only if g(e+k) - f(e). 
This defitlition is convenient because the expectation of the exchange rate 
with reSpE!ct to f is 1, while its expectation with respect to g is l+k. 
T h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a  k - s h i f t  c a p t u r e s  t h e  i d e a  t h a b  t h e  exchan~;e r a t e  
i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  d e p r e c i a t e  b y  k  w i t h  n o  c h a n g e  i n  i t s  v a r i a n c e  o r  o t h e l '  
m o m e n t s .  B e c a u s e  t h e  s t a t u s  g u o  l e v e l  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i s  a s s u m e d .  t o  b e  
u n i t y ,  i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i s  
1  i s  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  f o l l o w s  a  r a n d o m  w a l k .  W e  a r e  
i n t e r e s t e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  i n  m o r e  g e n e r a l  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p r o c e s s e s .  
W e  p r o c e e d  w i t h  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a n  e x p e c t e d  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  
l e v e l  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e .  T h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  g i v e n  e x o g e n o u s l y  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
o l i g o p o l i s t s  a r e  B a y e s i a n s  w h o  s h a r e  a  c o m m o n  p r i o r  o n  h o w  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  
w i l l  m o v e .  I f  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i s  g i v e n  b y  J e f ( e ) d e - l ,  
t h e n  t h e y  a s s u m e  i m p l i c i t l y  t h a t  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  f o l l o w s  a  r a n d o m  w a l k ,  
w h e r e a s  i f  t h e r e  e x p e c t a t i o n  i s  g i v e n  b y  J e g ( e ) d e - l + k ,  t h e n  t h e y  e x p e c t  t h e  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e  t o  m o v e  b y  l O O k  p e r c e n t .  W e  n o w  s t a t e  a  s i m p l e  r e s u l t  h , i v i n g  t o  
d o  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
L e m m a  7 :  U n d e r  a  r e g i m e  o f  f l o a t i n g  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s ,  a n  e x p e c t e d  d e p r e e i a t i o n  
( a p p r e c i a t i o n )  c a u s e s  a  d o m e s t i c  m o n o p o l i s t  t o  r a i s e  ( l o w e r )  h i s  o f f e r ,  
F u r t h e r ,  a  d o m e s t i c  m o n o p o l i s t ' s  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f f e r  i s  u n i q u e .  
P r o o f :  W e  e x a m i n e  a  k - s h i f t  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e .  R e c a l l  t h a t  s  solvE~s 
e q u a t i o n  ( 1 1 ) ,  w h i c h  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
e 
[l/f(s/s*)J Ja~(s;e)/as f(e) de - ~(s;s/s*). (12) 
(s/s*) 
The right side of (12) is increasing for any s less than the monopoly price in 
the world market. D*(p) is concave, we know that, for all e ~ s/s*,Because O
a~(s;e)/as ~ a~(s;s/s*)/as. Hence, 
e 
[l/f(s/s*)J Ja~(s;e)/as f(e) de ~ a~(s;s/s*)/as [l-F(s/s*)J/[f(s/s*)], 
(s/s*) 
which is equivalent to 
e 
[l/f(s/s*)] Ia~(s;e)/as f(e) de ~ a~(s;s/s*)/as [l/~(s/s*)l (13) 
(s/s*) 
where again ~(.) is the hazard rate of the density f(·). By Assumption 2, we 
that [l/~(s)] is decreasing in s; since D(p)O  D*(p)know and O  are concave, 
a~(s;s/,;*)/as is also decreasing in s. Hence, the the left side of (12) is 
decreaslng in s. This establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium offer. 
Further, note that for all k > 0 
ee  
f ( e )  d e .
Ja~(s;e)/as f ( e )  d e  ~ 
J.a~(S;e+k)/as 
( s / s * )  
( s / s * )  
H e n c e ,  a  k - s h i f t  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a n  o u t w a r d  s h i f t  o f  t h e  
c u r v e  d e f i n e d  i m p l i c i t l y  b y  t h e  l e f t  s i d e  o f  ( 1 2 ) .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a n  
e x p e c t e d  d e p r e c i a t i o n  c a u s e s  a  d o m e s t i c  m o n o p o l i s t '  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f f e r  t o  r i s e .  
T h e  r e a s o n i n g  f o r  a n  a p p r e c i a t i o n  i s  e x a c t l y  a n a l o g o u s .  Q . E . D ,  
F o r  c o m p l e t e n e s s ,  w e  s t a t e  L e m m a  8 .  
L e m m a  8 :  U n d e r  a  r e g i m e  o f  f l o a t i n g  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s ,  a n  e x p e c t e d  d e p r e c i a t i o n  
( a p p r e c i a t i o n )  o f  t h e  h o m e  c u r r e n c y  c a u s e s  a  f o r e i g n  m o n o p o l i s t  t o  l o w e r  
( r a i s e )  h i s  o f f e r .  F u r t h e r  a  f o r e i g n  m o n o p o l i s t ' s  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f f e r  i s  
u n i q u e .  
P r o o f :  T h i s  f o l l o w s  a s  a  c o r o l l a r y  o f  L e m m a  7 .  Q . E . D .  
W e  a r e  n o w  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  t o  e x a m i n e  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  t h e  e f f e c t : s  o f  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e .  A s s u m e  f o r  t h e  
n e x t  f o u r  l e m m a t a  t h a t  t h e  p a s t  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  w e r e  s u c h  
t h a t  E e  =  1 ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  v a l u e  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i s  a l s o  1 ,  a n d  t h e r e  h a s  
b e e n  a  s h i f t  o f  e x p e c t a t i o n s  s o  t h a t  n o w  E e  =  l + k  f o r  s o m e  k  i n  a  n e i . g b o r h o o d  
o f  O .  
L e m m a  9 :  U n d e r  f l o a t i n g  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s ,  i f  n  >  1  a n d  n *  >  1 ,  t h e n  t r . e  p a s s -
t h r o u g h  f u n c t i o n  i s  g i v e n  b y  
if e < 1
 
p(e) - { :
 
if e > 1 
Proof: The proof is identical to that of Lemma 2. Q.E.D. 
Note that the expected pass-through for this industry is given by l-F(l+k), 
which states that higher expected pass-through is associated with larger 
expected appreciations. Likewise, the higher the probability of a 
depreciation, the less likely that any pass-through will be observed. 
We continue with Lemma 10. 
Lemma lQ: Under floating exchange rates if n > 1 and n*-l, then the pass-
through function is given by 
(es*'-l)/(e-l) if e ::s l/s*'
p(e) - a{ if e > l/s*' 
where s*, is the foreign monopolist's equilibrium offer under the assumption 
that Ee-l+k. 
Proof: Under the initial exchange rate expectations, using Lemmata 1 and 6, 
we know that s-l and s* > 1. Hence, p(l;s,s*)-l. If the new expectations of 
the exchange rate are such that Ee-l+k, it is still true that s'=l, but 
s*'~s*. Nonetheless, using Lemma 6, s*, > 1. The conclusion then follows 
f r o m  t h e  u n i q u e n e s s  o f  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  a n d  a n  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  ( 9 ) .  
Q . E . D .  
T h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  i m p o r t a n t  o b s e r v a t i o n s  t o  m a k e  a b o u t  L e m m a  1 0 .  Firs'~, b y  t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  l e v e l  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i s  1  a n d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  f o r e i g n  m o n o p o l i s t  t o o k  a d v a n t a g e  o f  ~ a n t e  f l e x i b l e  r a t e s  t o  s h a d e  u p  
h i s  o f f e r  a b o v e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t ,  o n l y  t h e  h o m e  f i r m s  h a d  s a l e s  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  H e n c e ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  m a r k e t  p r i c e  w a s  1 .  S e c o n d ,  t h e r e  a r e  s m a l l  
r e a l i z e d  a p p r e c i a t i o n s  ( l / s * '  <  e  <  1 )  f o r  w h i c h  t h e r e  i s  n o  p a s s - t h r o u g h ;  
t h i s  o c c u r s  b e c a u s e  f o r e i g n  m o n o p o l i s t s  h a v e  h i g h e r  ( e x p e c t e d )  p r o f i 1 :  m a r g i n s  
t h a n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  c o m p e t i t o r s .  T h i r d ,  e v e n  i f  t h e r e  i s  a  larg~ e n o u g h  
r e a l i z e d  a p p r e c i a t i o n  s o  t h a t  w e  o b s e r v e  p a s s - t h r o u g h ,  w e  h a v e  p ( e )  < :  1  
b e c a u s e  
s * ,
'  >  1 .  H e n c e ,  w e  w i l l  n e v e r  s e e  f u l l  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h .  
W e  n o w  s t a t e  L e m m a  1 1 .  
L e m m a  1 1 :  U n d e r  f l o a t i n g  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s  i f  n - l  a n d  n *  >  1 ,  t h e n  t h e  p a s s -
t h r o u g h  f u n c t i o n  i s  g i v e n  b y  
I  
i f  e < s '  
p ( e )  -­
{  
( s ' - l ) / ( e - l )  
i f  e  ~ s '  
P r o o f :  I n  t h e  i n i t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  t h e  b e s t  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  w a s  
s * - l ,  w h i l e  t h a t  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  m o n o p o l i s t  w a s  s  >  1 .  U n d e r  t h e  n e w  e x c h a n g e  
r a t e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  w e  s t i l l  h a v e  s * - l  a n d  s '  >  1 .  T h e  c o n c l u s i o n  f o l l o w s  f r o m  
a n  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  ( 9 ) .  Q . E . D .  
Because the foreign firms make offers at cost and the domestic monopolist 
makes an offer above cost, there are small depreciations for which the foreign 
competite,rs still supply the world market. This corresponds to the common 
notion that foreign firms are keeping their offers down so as to maintain 
market share; what is really happening is the domestic producer prices above 
cost even if there is an expected appreciation. 
Finally, we state Lemma 12. 
Lemma 12 Under fixed exchange rates if n-l and n*~l, then the pass-through 
function is given by 
[es*' - min[s,s*]]/[e-l] if e < s/s*' 
p(H) - { 
[s' - min[s,s*]]/[e-l] if e ~ s/s*' 
Proof: In the initial equilibrium, the best offers were given by sand s* .
 
By Lemma t" we know that s > 1 and s* > 1. Therefore, the initial equilibrium
 
price p(l;s,s*) - min[s,s*]. The conclusion follows form an evaluation of
 
equation (9). Q.E.D.
 
We have illustrated way each monopolist's offer changes under the asssumption
 
of an anticipated depreciation in Figure 2, which appears on page 34. Figure
 
2 illustrates the two ways that an expected depreciation affects the
 
equilibriwn market price. First, the best offer of the domestic firm rises
 
and that of the foreign firm falls. Second, the entire exchange rate
 
distribution shifts rightward, increasing the likelihood that a depreciation
 
will actua:.ly be realized.
 
There are two points worth emphasizing about Lemma 12. First, the 
market price is above cost even when the realization of the exchange rate is 
1; we know, of course, that this follows from the fact that price noise allows 
both international duopolists to make offers above cost. Since we hav'e not 
made any assumptions about the syrnmmetry of the exchange rate distribution or 
about that of world demand, we cannot determine 2 priori whether s > s* or s < 
s*. We do know, however, for e-l, that min[s,es*] > 1; this implies that 
p(l;s,s*) > 1. Second, when there is an expected large depreciation 
(appreciation), there are small realized depreciations (appreciations) such 
that the equilibrium home currency market price actually falls (rises); that 
is, observed pass-through can actually be negative. Lemmata 7 and 8 imply 
that the home monopolist raises (lowers) his offer in expectation of the 
depreciation (appreciation), while the foreign monopolist lowers (raisl~s) his 
offer. We have graphed the pass-through function, under the assumptiol1 of an 
expected depreciation and using some arbitrary best response parameter:;, in 
Figure 3, which appears on page 35. 
We now state the main result of this section 
Theorem 3: If there is an expected depreciation (appreciation), then E~xpected 
pass-through will be higher (lower) if the domestic (foreign) market i~: 
monopolistic relative to its foreign (domestic) counterpart. 
Proof: This follows directly from Lemmata 9 through 12. Q.E.D. 
This theorem is of course the analog, for a regime of floating exchange rates, 
of Theorem 2. In particular, it makes the positive prediction that, under the 
current market expectations of a depreciation of the dollar, observed exchange 
rate pass-through will be higher in domestic industries which are monopolistic 
than in those which are competitive. Further, during the period of the 
dollar's expected appreciation, one should have observed lower pass-through in 
industries which were foreign monopolies. This occurs, of course, because 
monopolists of either nationality will increase their profit margins when the 
exchange rate is expected to move in their favor. 
6. Observed Pass-Through in Japanese Manufactures 
In this section, we present evidence on the relationship between 
industry concentration and exchange rate pass-through during 1984 and 1986. 
These are of course both periods during which the major currencies were 
floating, and the first was a period of strong yen depreciation (against the 
dollar), while the second was one of strong yen appreciation. We assume that 
oligopolists expected the yen to weaken against the dollar in 1984 and to 
strengtb~n in 1986. We did not use data from 1985 because it was a year of 
changing; expectations about the yen's strength. Our theoretical analysis 
makes the positive prediction that pass-through will be higher in Japanese 
industries which were relatively concentrated. 
It is unfortunately extremely difficult to get a current measure of 
concentration in a cross-spectrum of Japanese industries. There is some work 
on industrial organization in Japan by Caves and Uekusa [3], but they rely on 
concentI'ation ratios collected by the Fair Trade Commission of Japan given in 
[10]. lbose ratios are dated, and they give only the historical evolution of 
concentI'ation within selected industries, not concentration across a sample of 
industri.es. In order to construct measures of concentration across 
i n d u s t r i e s ,  w e  u s e d  t h e  J a p a n  S t a t i s t i c a l  Y e a r b o o k  [ 1 1 ] .  T h e  c h a p t 1 a r  e n t i t l e d  
B u s i n e s s  O p e r a t i o n s  g i v e s  s U m m a r y  a g g r e g a t e  f i n a n c i a l  d a t a  f o r  p r i n i c p a l  
e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  a  c r o s s - s p e c t r u m  o f  i n d u s t r i e s ;  a  p r i n c i p a l  e n t e r p r i s e  i s  
e i t h e r  a  c o m p a n y  w i t h  a  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  o f  a t  l e a s t  o n e  b i l l i o n  y e n o r  a  
c o m p a n y  w h i c h  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  a  " l e a d i n g  e n t e r p r i s e "  i n  i t s  i n d u s t r y .  I n  1 9 8 1 ,  
t h e r e  w e r e  a  t o t a l  o f  3 4 2  s u c h  c o m p a n i e s  i n  t h e  n i n e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  
i n  o u r  s a m p l e .  T h e s e  d a t a  a r e  n o t  g i v e n  o n  a  f i r m  b y  f i r m  b a s i s  b u t  a r e  
p r e s e n t e d  a s  a  t o t a l  f o r  a l l  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  e n t r e p r i s e s  i n  a n  i n d u s t r y .  T h i s  
c h a p t e r  a l s o  g i v e s  t o t a l  s a l e s  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  manufact'~ring 
i n d u s t r i e s .  T h e s e  s a l e s  f i g u r e s  w e r e  u s e d  t o  c a l c u l a t e  a  r o u g h  m e a s u r e  o f  
i n d u s t r y  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  i n  1 9 8 1 ,  a n d  t h e y  a r e  r e p o r t e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  , : o l u m n  o f  
t h e  t a b l e  b e l o w .  
I t  i s  o f  c o u r s e  a l m o s t  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  g e t  d a t a  o n  o l i g o p o l i s t s '  o f f e r s ,  
b u t  t h e  R e s e a r c h  a n d  S t a t i s t i c s  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  t h e  B a n k  o f  J a p a n  d o e s  p r o v i d e  
d i s a g g r e g a t e d  w h o l e s a l e  p r i c e  i n d i c e s  i n  [ 2 ] .  T h e s e  i n d i c e s  a r e  d i s a g g r e g a t e d  
i n t o  t e n  d i f f e r e n t  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s u b s e c t o r s ,  a n d  t h e y  a r e  f u r t h e r  
d i s a g g r e g a t e d  i n  e a c h  s u b s e c t o r  i n t o  a v e r a g e  p r i c e s  f o r  e x p o r t s ,  i m p o r t s ,  a n d  
g o o d s  p r o d u c e d  f o r  d o m e s t i c  d e m a n d .  T h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s u b s e c t o r s  c o r r e s p o n d  
s e r e n d i p i t o u s l y  t o  t h o s e  d e f i n e d  i n  t h e  J a p a n  S t a t i s t i c a l  Y e a r b o o k ,  a n d  n i n e  
o f  t h e  u n i v e r s e  o f  t e n  w e r e  c h o s e n  f o r  t h e  t a b l e  b e l o w .  T h e  p e t r o l e u m  
i n d u s t r y  w a s  e x c l u d e d  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  i s  o n l y  o n e  p e t r o l e u m  p r o d u c t  e x p o r t e d  
f r o m  J a p a n ,  a n d  i t s  p r i c i n g  d i d  n o t  m o v e  a t  a l l  w i t h  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  
a d j u s t m e n t s .  
Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Industrial Concentration in Japanese 
Manufacturing Industries in 1984 and 1986 
Concentration 1984 1986 
Manufacturing Industry (A) (B) (C) 
Processed Foodstuffs 22.7 1.6 -9.6 
Machinery 23.2 1.1 -4.5 
Ceramic, Stone, and Clay Products 24.8 4.9 -14.7 
Textile Products 36.0 -1.4 -5.7 
Chemicals and Allied Products 37.3 1.6 -14.9 
Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and 
Supplies 43.6 0.1 -3.7 
Non-Ferrous Metal Products 46.1 9.1 6.7 
Iron and Steel 59.6 5.2 -14.6 
Transport Equipment 76.6 4.5 -1.1 
Notes: 
All numbers are percents. Column (A) measures the ratio of sales by principal 
enterprises to total industry sales in 1981. Column (B) measures the 
difference between the change in export prices and domestic prices for each 
industry during the twelve months ending in December 1984. Column (C) is the 
analagous measure for the twelve months ending in November 1986. The sources 
are described in the text. 
The industries are presented in order of increasing concentration. 
The second column gives the percentage difference between the change in 
industrie:~' average export prices and and average domestic prices during 1984, 
and the third column gives the analogous number for 1986. We use the 
differencl~ between export prices and domestic prices in order to control for 
the effec1: that exchange rate movements had on costs, which was explicitly not 
a part of our model. First, it is reassuring that export prices rose more 
rapidly than domestic prices when the yen was depreciating and fell more 
rapidly when the yen was appreciating; this is of course one of the positive 
implications of our theory. Second, the Spearman statistic for the rank 
correlation between pass-through and industry concentration is significant at 
the ninety percent confidence level for 1984, but its is not significant for 
1 9 8 6 .  T h e  s m a l l  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  e x p o r t  p r i c e s  o f  t r a n s p o r t  e q u i p m e n t  
c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  a  rank~orrelation i n  1 9 8 6 .  P e r h a p s  t h e  
" v o l u n t a r y "  e x p o r t  r e s t r a i n t s  o n  a u t o m o b i l e  e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a v e  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  c a r t e l i z e d  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n d u s t r y  s o  t h a t  J a p a n e s e  f i r m s  h a v e  
n o t  h a d  t o  c u t  e x p o r t  p r i c e s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a s  t h e  y e n  h a s  a p p r e c i a t e d .  
7 .  C o n c l u s i o n  
T h e  c e n t r a l  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  i s  t h a t  o b s e r v e d  exchang4~ r a t e  
p a s s - t h r o u g h  d e p e n d s  u p o n  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e .  T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  w a s  c o r r o b o r a t e d  
b y  e v i d e n c e  f r o m  a  s a m p l e  o f  J a p a n e s e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  
p e r i o d  o f  t h e  y e n ' s  d e p r e c i a t i o n .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  m o d e l  s h o w s  t h a 1 :  
o l i g o p o l i s t s  u s e  t h e i r  m a r k e t  p o w e r  t o  s e t  p r i c e s  i n  a n t i c p a t i o n  o f  e x c h a n g e  
r a t e  m o v e m e n t s ;  w e  s h o u l d  e x p e c t ,  t h e n ,  t o  s e e  h i g h e r  r a t e s  o f  i n f l a 1 : i o n  i n  
r e l a t i v e l y  c o n c e n t r a t e d  d o m e s t i c  i n d u s t r i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  e u r r e n t  
d e p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  d o l l a r .  
T w o  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  m o d e l  a r e  t h a t  i t  i s  a  m o d e l  o f  a  h o m o g e n e o u s  
g o o d  p r o d u c e d  b y  i d e n t i c a l  f i r m s  f a c i n g  n o  c a p a c i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s  a n d  t h a t  i t  
d o e s  n o t  c o n s i d e r  t h e  l o n g e r  r u n  e v o l u t i o n  o f  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e .  F i r s t : ,  m u c h  
o f  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  i n  t h e  l a s t  d e c a d e s  h a s  o c c u r r e d  i n  g o o d s  
w h e r e  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i s  i m p o r t a n t ,  a n d  t h e  c u r r e n t  i n t e r n a t i c 1 n a l  
e n v i r o n m e n t  f o r  c o m m e r c i a l  p o l i c y  m a k e s  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  n o  c a p a c i t y  
c o n s t r a i n t s  q u i t e  s u s p e c t .  I t  i s  u n f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  a n d  
b a r r i e r s  t o  t r a d e  a r e  a  v e r y  r e a l  p a r t  o f  a n y  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
i n d u s t r y ;  i n d e e d ,  t h e y  p r o b a b l y  s e r v e  t o  c r e a t e  s u c h  o l i g o p o l i e s .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  
m o d e l  d i d  n o t  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  c o n t i n u e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  s h o c k . s  o n  t h e  
e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  f i r m s  i n  a n  i n d u s t r y .  W e  d i d  n o t  m o d e l  t h e  e n t r y  
or exil: decisions of firms in industries where there were positive or zero 
expectE!d profits. See Baldwin [1] for some recent work on the effect of sunk 
costs i.n an environment with exchange rate variability. 
The model does serve to underscore several important considerations. 
First, the strategic inter-dependence of firms' decisions are an important 
part of the pass-through effect. Second, one ought not to expect that 
exchange rate pass-through is uniform across industries that have different 
competitive structures; moreover, home monopoly tends to increase pass-through 
while foreign monopoly tends to decrease it. Third, both exchange rate 
expectations and realizations matter for equilibrium prices in oligopolies. 
In particular, the large depreciation of the dollar during the last eighteen 
months Inay matter less than oligopolists' expectations about how the dollar 
will mO'7e during the course of their firms' current planning horizons. 
Fourth, although exchange rate volatility increases the profit margins of 
monopoli.stic firms, it does so at the expense of consumer surplus. It is in 
this sense that volatile exchange rates, like barriers to trade, may serve to 
decrease world welfare while raising the expected profits of producers in 
oligopolistic industries. 
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